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Abstract
This paper explains why trade liberalizations occur in developing countries, and why they are often
reversed. It does so by focusing on the use of lobbying for protection by import competing firms as a
means to postpone costly product quality upgrades to keep up with foreign competitors. Given the
availability of a political market for import tariffs, domestic firms will lobby for a sequence of tariffs
that insulate domestic profits from a widening quality gap, thereby allowing adjustment to be
postponed. But as the contributions required by the government grow with the size of the quality gap,
it will be optimal to adjust quality and to decrease the lobbying effort at some time, leading to
liberalization and technological catch-up. But then the equilibrium tariff will again be small and
“cheap”, and it will pay to start lobbying anew, until the next quality adjustment. Therefore, cycles in
protection will occur as a result of the use of lobbying as a substitute for innovation. The model thus
sheds new light on the impact of the costs of protection on the effectiveness of the lobbying effort over
time, and on their implications for the timing and the time horizon of trade reforms in developing
countries.
Keywords: Quality ladders, North-South Trade, Imitation, Endogenous Tariffs, Lobbying, Trade
Liberalization, Cycles.
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1. Introduction
The rush to free-trade by developing countries in the past decade has
represented a dramatic turnaround in the trade policy stance adopted by most of these
countries, after several decades of pursuing inward-looking strategies.
1 However, these
have not been the first trade reforms attempted by these nations. During the post-War
era many of these countries undertook at some point a comprehensive trade
liberalization that included a major discrete reduction in barriers to imports of foreign
goods. But the high hopes associated with these reforms were quickly erased in most
cases, as protectionist pressures ultimately prevailed and closed trade policies were re-
implemented.
2 And while the increasing integration of the world economy seems to
hold enormous promise for locking in the recent liberalizations, many of these reforms
have already experienced partial reversals that, albeit disguised as measures to
countervail balance of payment problems, have been considered to be accommodating
domestic demands for protection.
3 All these episodes suggest the existence of cycles in
protection in many developing countries.
4 Given that interest-group lobbying activity
has been pointed out as the main factor behind recurrent protectionism in these
economies, it is worth inquiring into the political-economic interactions behind the
implementation of trade reforms and into their implications for the time horizon of
trade liberalization.
In order to shed light on these issues, I will explore the hypothesis that there is
a direct effect of closed trade policies on technological backwardness, that is perceived
by policymakers, and which weakens the power of trade lobbyists over time, leading to
a liberalization as the technological gap reaches an intolerable level.
5 This hypothesis is
inspired by the series of empirical studies that find that isolation from foreign
competition discourages innovation and hurts growth, suggesting that the political3
attitude towards protection will most likely become less favorable over time, as closure
imposes increasing costs on society.
6 A representative sample of these costs of
protection is provided by Little et al (1970), who found that for many protected
industries in developing countries in the 1960s the value of domestic output at world
prices was less than the value of tradable inputs at world prices; i.e., these activities
were not viable without protection. An important example is the Indian Ambassador
automobile: the original model remained unchanged for 30 years, despite global
advances in this industry.
7 Another good example is the Acindar steel firm in
Argentina, whose first plant was built during World War II and kept in operation
without major improvements in an isolated environment until 1978, despite having
been acknowledged as obsolete fifteen years before that.
8
The possibility of the occurrence of trade liberalization as a result of the
increasing welfare losses from protection will be analyzed here from the point of view
of individual firms or industries, in order to draw implications for the occurrence of
cycles at the aggregate level. The scenario analyzed is one in which the government
makes available a market for protection that is viewed by domestic firms as a means to
postpone costly innovation to keep up with foreign competitors. This availability of
“protection for sale” is likely to lead to both increasing protection levels and a
widening in the technological gap. However, if the cost of lobbying rises with the level
of protection, a point may be reached in which innovating and reducing the lobbying
effort become more profitable. At this point, “liberalization” and catch-up would take
place. But once the adjustment has occurred, lobbying is likely to become cheap again,
thus leading to the possibility of a new cycle in protection.
In the model developed here, domestic firms engage in Bertrand competition
with foreign producers that are upgrading product quality at a constant and exogenous4
rate. In the absence of innovation, prices and profits will be falling as result of the
widening quality gap. Domestic firms must incur a fixed cost to imitate foreign
innovations, and hence they do not continuously imitate, but rather define a sequence
of intervals during which quality is held constant, followed by a catch-up to foreign
quality between intervals. When a market for protection is made available, the firms
lobby for sequences of rising tariffs that offset the effect of the widening gap over
prices and profits, mitigating the need for adjustment. However, the welfare losses
from protection and the associated contributions from lobbying firms required by the
government will rise with the size of the tariff. Domestic firms will thus still find it
profitable to adjust at intervals of constant duration, and to simultaneously reduce the
lobbying effort. At this point, the equilibrium tariff experiences a discrete reduction,
and a liberalization ensues, but is followed by a new cycle in protection as the quality
gap widens again.
The model thus provides a new insight regarding the time path of trade policies
in developing countries. Increasing technological backwardness as a result of
endogenous protection is found to be an important determinant of liberalization. By the
same token, the catch-up that follows the liberalization is found to facilitate a renewal
of protection, by lowering the costs of lobbying. The mechanism analyzed here
provides an explanation for the occurrence of cycles at a firm or industry level, but it
can be reconciled with the occurrence of aggregate cycles by means of the occurrence
of an aggregate shock to the political system, such as the trade reform conditionalities
imposed by the multilateral lending organizations in the 1980s, which would coordinate
liberalization and catch-up across the board. The differences across industries would be
revealed by the degree of liberalization in each industry, and by the differences in the
speed of return to a growing protection path.5
These findings add to the view that trade reforms attain when macroeconomic
crises relegate distributional considerations to a second plane, facilitating the reform by
agenda-setting technocrats which ascribe as the costs of protection only the traditional
static Harberger triangles.
9 The model also has the interesting feature that it offers a
pure political economy explanation for trade liberalization, thus adding to the terms of
trade motive proposed by the literature on reciprocal trade liberalization.
10
Furthermore, the mechanism presented in this model captures the stylized fact that
trade liberalization in developing countries tends to occur in a rather abrupt fashion,
especially when compared to the time it takes to build up protection.
11
The vast literature on the political determination of trade policies in a static
framework, while providing useful insights, falls short of explaining the time path of
protection.
12 It is thus necessary to develop models of endogenous protection in a
dynamic framework, where the trade policies implemented are the result of politico-
economic equilibria that are changing over time, as suggested by Krueger (1993). The
model developed here attempts to fill a small portion of this void.
13 In this vein, it
complements Krueger’s view that endogenous protection had increasing costs that
contributed to its own demise, but differs in that Krueger proposes that these costs
arose mainly from the increasing economic disarray associated to the intricate cobweb
of discretionary policies, rather than from a deliberate attempt to postpone costly
technological improvements.
14
This paper closely relates to the literature that explains the occurrence of long
cycles of stagnation and growth in a closed economy in terms of the use of political
influence by incumbent innovators to prohibit the adoption of new technologies.
15 It is
also connected to the literature that focuses on the repeated use of lobbying to explain
the persistence, and eventual termination, of protection to declining industries that6
must undertake costly adjustment in response to a terms of trade shock.
16 Finally, it is
linked as well to the literature that analyzes how technology adoption is delayed by
temporary protection, granted until the firm innovates, and how a firm may never
innovate and temporary protection may become permanent if the government cannot
credibly commit to liberalize trade.
17 An interesting implication of this strand of
literature and this paper is that they suggest that trade policies and productivity growth
may both be endogenous variables, as opposed to the usual theoretical and empirical
treatment of trade liberalization as exogenous and productivity growth as endogenous.
In Section 2 I present a model of quality adjustment for domestic firms which
compete with foreign producers that are continuously updating the quality of their
products. In Section 3, I introduce the availability of a political market for endogenous
tariffs, and derive the equilibrium tariffs and their time path, and the optimal policy for
quality adjustment and lobbying. In Section 4, I suggest a mechanism for the
coordination of cycles at the aggregate level. In Section 5, I present the main
conclusions, and suggest extensions to this line of research.
2. A Model of Quality Adjustment
In this section I analyze the optimal quality adjustment policy for “Southern”
firms that engage in Bertrand competition with “Northern” producers that are
upgrading product quality at a constant and exogenous rate. The main result of this
section is that under the assumption of fixed costs to imitation the optimal policy for
domestic firms will be to keep product quality unchanged over intervals of constant
duration, and to catch up to foreign quality between intervals. As a result of the
widening of the quality gap between Northern and Southern goods, prices and profits
will fall continuously within each interval, experiencing discrete increases at the time of13
imitation, but not indefinitely, since domestic prices would still decline continuously in
response to the widening quality gap in each interval.
3. Endogenous Tariff Cycles
I now consider the implications of the availability of a political market for
import tariffs. Each firm will act as a profit maximizer, and will lobby for its own tariff,
since the other firms’ tariffs will not affect its profits.
27 The problem is symmetric to all
firms, and I can thus focus on the behavior of a representative firm. The equilibrium
tariff will result from a contribution game between the firm and the government, a
dynamic analogue of Grossman and Helpman (1994).
28  At each time the firm will
confront the government with a contribution schedule for different tariffs, chosen
optimally in anticipation of the politician’s response, given the quality gap at that
instant. The government will then choose the tariff that maximizes its own welfare at
that time.
29 The firm will seek tariffs that dampen the effect of a growing quality gap
on profits, allowing adjustment to be postponed. However, the required contributions
are likely to be growing as the gap widens, eroding the benefits from lobbying without
adjusting. Therefore, it is in order to inquire if the firm will choose to lobby for a
sequence of tariffs that allow it to delay imitation indefinitely, or if it will prefer to
adjust at regular intervals. It is also necessary to determine if the firm will lobby for
protection at all the levels of the quality gap, or only after a certain threshold has been
reached.
The main results of this section can be briefly summarized. There will be cycles
in protection. The optimal policy for the domestic firm will be to lobby for a sequence
of tariffs that exactly offset the negative effects of a widening quality gap on prices and
profits. However, since the campaign contributions required by the government will be22
When free trade initially prevails, the firm’s contribution to growth of the
consumption index will be positive, as domestic prices decline in response to the
widening quality gap. This contribution will be nil during the protectionist phase, as
tariffs offset the increasing gap. Finally, the contribution to growth will experience a
discrete increase at the time of the imitation.
42 When permanent lobbying is optimal,
the contribution to growth will be nil during the interval without adjustment.
However, this contribution will be positive at the time of the imitation, as the quality
adjusted price experiences a discrete fall.
43
4. Coordinated cycles
The mechanism analyzed here provides an explanation for the occurrence of
cycles at a firm or industry level. The cycles would be exactly simultaneous only if all
the industries were technologically identical, with the same relative costs of
production, the same costs of imitation, the same foreign quality rate of growth, and
they all started at the same point in time. In this sense, the main point of the paper is to
analyze how the increasing welfare costs of protection arising from the associated
technological backwardness negatively affect the effectiveness of the lobbying effort
over time, i.e., how they facilitate liberalization. Additionally, it seeks to shed light on
the incentives to re-start lobbying after a liberalization.
Nevertheless, the predictions of this model can be reconciled with the
occurrence of cycles at an aggregate level under a series of reasonable assumptions
that have historical support. If the outset of World War II were taken as a starting
point for most industries, the model would predict that after a period of increasing
levels of protection and backwardness, a sequence of liberalizations at the industry-
level would attain, and that their distribution over time would depend on the23
distribution of the technological characteristics across different industries. However,
trade liberalizations have usually occurred simultaneously with the implementation of
stabilization programs supported by multilateral lending organizations that included
trade reform conditionalities. Such developments could be captured by the model in the
form of a negative shock to the preferences for contributions, that coordinates the
liberalizations across industries, leading to a simultaneous technological catch-up. The
differences across industries would be revealed by the degree of liberalization in each
industry, and by the speed of return to a growing protection path. Those industries that
face higher relative costs of production and/or faster foreign technological upgrading
would have higher tariffs following a liberalization, and would also be the ones that




Reliance on these exogenous shocks as a coordination device has the
disadvantage of apparently suggesting macroeconomic crisis as the determinant of
trade liberalization, as in Rodrik (1994). However, the model presented here is
identified with respect to the latter by its prediction of a progressive return to growing
protection and technological stagnation, at different speeds per industry, as it has been
observed in the previous experiences of temporary trade liberalization and the recent
episodes of partial reversal to protectionism. Macroeconomic crisis operates here only
as a coordination devise, not as a determinant of liberalization.
5. Conclusions and extensions
The main contribution of the paper is to show how the increasing welfare costs
of protection arising from technological backwardness reduce the effectiveness of the
lobbying effort over time, thus facilitating liberalization. Additionally, it seeks to show24
the incentives to re-start lobbying after a liberalization and catch-up. The model shows
that if a market for protection is made available, firms that must costly imitate foreign
technology to keep up with foreign competitors will find it optimal to lobby for a
sequence of tariffs that insulate domestic prices and profits from foreign innovations.
Such a behavior will lead to persistent protection, and to a widening technology gap.
However, if the government is factoring in the increasing  welfare losses of protection,
it will require increasing lobbying efforts to maintain protection, and a point will be
reached in which domestic firms will prefer to adjust and to allow for a trade
liberalization. But now that the firm has caught up with foreign technology, the tariffs
needed to offset new foreign innovations are again small and politically inexpensive,
and it thus pays to start lobbying again, leading to a cycle in protection. While the
model generates the prediction of cycles at the firm or industry level, it can be easily
reconciled with the occurrence of cycles at the aggregate level using a series of
reasonable assumptions that have historical support.
The model offers some interesting insights about the dynamics of protection in
developing countries. The previous episodes of transitory trade liberalization fit nicely
into the predictions of the model, as these nations experienced lackluster growth before
the liberalization and after the reversal, and high growth during the open period. The
main reasons cited for the reversals, namely political and ideological shifts, are also
consistent with the mechanisms presented here. The predictions of the model are also
consistent with the observed links between protectionism and technological
backwardness, and with the productivity gains following large liberalizations. An
important implication of this model, shared with the literature on contingent protection
and innovation, is that it raises the possibility that trade policies and the associated
productivity performance be both endogenous variables, as opposed to most25
theoretical and empirical approaches that treat trade liberalization as exogenous and
productivity growth as endogenous. As for the recent liberalizations en masse, the
model would have to rely on the trade reform conditionalities imposed by multilateral
lending organizations following the debt crisis of the early 1980s as a shock to the
effectiveness of lobbying, that abruptly shortened the protectionist cycle across
industries in most developing nations. However, the partial reversals in the recent
reforms can be explained by the model as the beginning of a new protectionist cycle in
industries in countries where the political preferences for contributions from lobbies
and/or production costs are relatively high.
One interesting extension to the analysis done here would be to generate an
endogenous coordination of cycles. One scenario worth studying is one in which goods
have a higher elasticity of substitution in consumption, which could introduce
complementarity in the lobbying activities by different firms. In this case, an increase in
protection for one good would increase demand for other industries’ goods, which
could enhance the profitability of lobbying in these industries, thus leading to the
possibility of endogenously coordinated cycles. Another scenario worth studying is one
in which the high-tech firms produce import-competing intermediate inputs, and in
which the other domestic productive sectors that demand these inputs lobby against
protection. This extension may yield the result of the attainment of permanent free
trade following a first protectionist phase, if the discrete transfer of resources to the
producer of final goods following a trade liberalization helps it to countervail the
lobbying effort by the import competing firms.262728
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